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PAYING NCAA ATHLETES
DAVID J. BERRI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The NCAA has recently faced unprecedented legal challenges that could
fundamentally alter the labor market it faces. The most prominent of these is
the case brought by Ed O'Bannon.1 United States District Court Judge Claudia
Wilken ruled in 2014 that NCAA amateurism rules violate federal antitrust laws
and players were entitled to $5,000 per year for name, image, and
likeness rights.2 In 2015, the Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals reduced the $5,000 payment to a simple cost of attendance payment 3
(which many schools already provide).4
Another case, Jenkins v. NCAA,5 directly attacks the NCAA rules limiting
the pay of athletes to the cost of attendance. This case—argued by Jeffrey
Kessler—asserts that the NCAA violates antitrust laws when it limits how
schools compensate their student-athletes.6
And then there was the proposed union for football players at Northwestern
University. In February 2014, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held
a hearing to decide if football players were employees and, therefore, had the
right to unionize.7
The NCAA contended football players were
* David J. Berri earned his Ph.D. from Colorado State University. He is an applied microeconomist
with teaching and research interests in the economics of sport, with a focus on player performance,
competitive balance, college sports, and gender economics.
1. See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015). O'Bannon starred at UCLA from 1991 to 1995. Years later he discovered his
likeness being used in a video game by EA Sports. O'Bannon sued both EA Sports and the NCAA for
using his likeness without his permission and without compensation.
2. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08.
3. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076–79. The Ninth Circuit, though, did affirm that the NCAA rules
violated federal antitrust laws. Michael McCann, What the Appeals Court Ruling Means for
O’Bannon’s Ongoing NCAA Lawsuit, SI, http://www.si.com/college-basketball/2015/09/30/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit-appeals-court-ruling (last updated Oct. 2, 2015).
4. McCann, supra note 3.
5. See generally Jenkins v. NCAA, 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).
6. Liz Mullen, Kessler: Ruling in O’Bannon Will Aid in NCAA Antitrust Case, SPORTS BUS. J., Oct.
12, 2015, at 15.
7. The Author served as an expert witness for the union at the original NLRB hearing on this issue.
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“student-athletes”; the term was actually invented by the NCAA in the 1950s in
response to a claim by a former NCAA football player who demanded workers’
compensation.8 Walter Byers (the executive director of the NCAA from 1951
to 1987) noted in his 1995 autobiography, “We crafted the term student-athlete,
and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as a mandated
substitute for such words as players and athletes. We told college publicists to
speak of ‘college teams,’ not football or basketball ‘clubs,’ a word common to
the pros.”9
The initial NLRB ruling rejected the NCAA’s contention and supported the
argument that college athletes are employees who have the right to unionize. In
2015, though, the NLRB refused to rule on the appeal in the case. By refusing
to rule, the players were effectively denied the right to unionize.10
At the moment, the NCAA does not appear to be losing these cases.
Therefore, something akin to the status quo is being maintained. But it seems
unlikely that these legal challenges will cease. And if one is successful, the labor
market in college sports could fundamentally change.
The purpose of this Article is to answer three questions related to how
changes in the labor market could impact the future of college sports:
1. Why did schools decide to dramatically limit the pay of
student-athletes? This first question must be answered to
understand the current market.
2. How does this practice impact the level of competitive
balance in college sports? This second question directly
addresses the NCAA’s assertion that labor market restrictions
are necessary to maintain competitive balance.
3. How much would student-athletes be paid if schools did not
limit their compensation? This last question examines what a
free market for labor would look like for the “student-athletes”
(i.e., employees) the NCAA employs.
The answers to these three questions will reveal that much of what the NCAA
8. Opinion, The O’Bannon Ruling: ‘Student-Athlete’ Is History, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/opinion/the-obannon-ruling-student-athlete-is-history.html.
9. WALTER BYERS & CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE
ATHLETES 69 (4th ed. 1998) (emphasis omitted); accord The O’Bannon Ruling: ‘Student-Athlete’ Is
History, supra note 8.
10. Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrb-says-northwestern-football-players-cannot-unionize.html.
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claims regarding athlete compensation runs counter to the empirical evidence.
II.

BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN COLLEGE SPORTS

There is a tendency to think the commercialization of college sports is
something that has only recently happened. In fact, though, college sports have
been commercialized for more than a century. For example, in 1890, Woodrow
Wilson, then-president of Princeton University (and future president of the
United States), told the alumni of his school, “Princeton is noted in this wide
world for three things: football, baseball, and collegiate [instruction].”11
Football was certainly big business for Princeton. In the late 1880s, the
Princeton–Yale game attracted 40,000 paying spectators.12 The 1893
Thanksgiving game between these two schools generated $13,000 in revenue
for each school,13 or $313,297 in 2014 dollars.14
The revenue generated by sporting events leads to what should be an
obvious question: How much revenue should be paid to the athletes who the
fans are paying to see?
In every other business in American society, workers must be paid at least
a minimum wage from the revenue generated by the firm. Colleges and
universities, though, have gotten around this practice by relabeling the workers’
titles. Rather than call the athletes competing on the field “workers,” colleges
and universities utilize the term “student-athlete.” In addition, schools also
argue that student-athletes are “amateurs”15 and, therefore, are not entitled to be
paid.
Meanwhile, the revenues generated by college sports keep increasing. In
2014, NCAA revenues were nearly $1 billion.16 Much of this revenue is
11. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME
COLLEGE SPORTS 7 (1999) (quoting ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 45 (1992)).
12. Id.
13. Kavitha A. Davidson, The Ivy League Origins of Thanksgiving Football, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-26/the-ivy-league-origins-ofthanksgiving-football.
14. The real value of dollars in 1893 was determined via the GDP deflator. See generally Samuel
H. Williamson, Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount - 1774 to Present,
MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/m/calculators/uscompare/result.php?year_
source=1893&amount=13,000&year_result=2014 (last visited June 9, 2016).
15. The word “amateur” tends to have a very circular definition when applied by the NCAA. As
Patrick Hruby has noted, “[C]ollege sports are amateur because otherwise they wouldn't be college
sports, which are amateur.” Patrick Hruby, Court of Illusion, SPORTSONEARTH (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/62747894/.
16. Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Nearly Topped $1 Billion in Revenue in 2014, USA TODAY (Mar. 11,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/03/11/ncaa-financial-statement-2014-1billion-revenue/70161386/.
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generated from the sale of media rights.17 These media rights exist because fans
enjoy watching college athletes compete. Because of NCAA rules, though,
compensation of the athletes who generate the revenue is significantly
restricted.
III. THE COMPETITIVE BALANCE STORY
The limit on player pay in college sports is officially related to the drive to
promote competitive balance or relative equality in the strength of the
competitors in each competition. As Jim Peach notes,
Promoting competitive balance is a major concern of the
NCAA. Three of the NCAA’s core principles directly address
competitive balance. These are core principles 2.10 The
Principle of Competitive Equity, 2.11 The Principle
Governing Recruiting, and 2.12 The Principle Governing
Eligibility. These principles state, in part:
 Core Principle 2.10: The structure and programs of
the Association and the activities of its members
shall promote opportunity for equity in
competition to assure that individual student
athletes and institutions will not be prevented
unfairly from achieving the benefits inherent in
participation in intercollegiate athletics.
 Core Principle 2.11: The Principle Governing
Recruiting. Regulations shall be designed to
promote equity among member institutions . . . .
 Core Principle 2.12: The Principle Governing
Eligibility. Eligibility requirements shall be
designed to assure proper emphasis on
educational objectives, to promote competitive
equity among institutions, and to prevent
exploitation of student athletes.
. . . In a meaningful sense, the principles governing
recruiting and eligibility were adopted by the NCAA in order
to promote competitive balance. Indeed, the principle of
amateurism and various regulations concerning financial aid

17. Id.
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are also intended to promote competitive balance.18
Despite this objective, though, Peach notes that competitive balance does
not characterize college sports.19 This point is established by looking at who
generally wins in various sports. For example, Peach notes,












From 1950 to 2006, 50.4% of all final four
appearances in NCAA men’s basketball were made by
thirteen different schools. 20 There are more than 300
schools in Division I-A eligible to play in the NCAA
tournament, but less than 5% of these schools dominate
the Final Four.
From 1982 to 2005, 51% of all final four appearances
in NCAA women’s basketball were made by just six
schools.21
From 1947 to 2005, 50% of all appearances in the
championship game of the NCAA college world
series were made by just seven schools.22
From 1982 to 2005, 58.3% of all appearances in the
championship games of NCAA women’s softball were
made by just two schools.23
From 1970 to 2005, 61.1% of the appearances in the
championship game in NCAA men’s volleyball were
made by just three schools.24
From 1981 to 2005, 58.3% of all appearances in the
championship games in NCAA women’s volleyball
were made by just four schools.25

College football has historically not had a championship. However, in
looking at the top eight slots in the final Associated Press poll, Peach reports
18. Jim Peach, College Athletics, Universities, and the NCAA, 44 SOC. SCI. J. 11, 14 (2007)
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
19. See id. at 15–20.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id. at 17–18.
23. Id. at 19–20.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 19–20.
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that 51.6% of those slots from 1950 to 2005 were held by just twelve schools.26
In sport after sport, Peach found that a small collection of schools
dominated. It was not the same schools in each sport, but in each sport, there
are a collection of schools that appear to control the competition. In sum,
college sports do not have competitive balance.
It appears the restriction on pay is the primary reason for the lack of
balance. The Duke Blue Devils won the 2015 NCAA Men's Basketball
Championship with three players—Tyus Jones, Jahlil Okafor, and Justise
Winslow—who were selected in the first twenty-four picks of the 2015 NBA
draft. The University of Kentucky reached the Final Four in 2015 with six
players selected in the NBA draft—a list that included Karl-Anthony Towns
(first pick), Willie Cauley-Stein (sixth pick), Trey Lyles (twelfth pick), and
Devin Booker (thirteenth pick). In contrast, of the 351 schools that played
Division I-A basketball, 320 did not have a single player selected in the 2015
NBA draft.
Why do the top schools have so many drafted players? The key is whom
they recruit. Each year the top high school players are ranked by a variety of
different experts. The Recruiting Services Consensus Index27 summarizes these
rankings to create a consensus listing of the top players each year.28
As one can see, from 2009 to 2014, John Calipari, head coach at the
University of Kentucky, was able to recruit twenty-seven of these players. So
far, only one of these players stayed at Kentucky long enough to graduate. Of
the remaining twenty-six, twenty were drafted by an NBA team, many after only
playing one season at Kentucky.
Table One: Top Ranked High School Players Recruited by John Calipari
at the University of Kentucky: 2009–2014
Recruiting
Year

RSCI
Rank

2009

Player

Outcome (as of June, 2015)

2

John Wall

Drafted

2009

3

DeMarcus Cousins

Drafted

2009

16

Daniel Orton

Drafted

2009

55

Eric Bledsoe

Drafted

2009

58

Jon Hood

Stayed in school for five years

2010

5

Brandon Knight

Drafted

26. Id. at 15–16.
27. RSCIHOOPS, https://sites.google.com/site/rscihoops/home (last visited June 9, 2016).
28. Basketball-Reference reports the RSCI rankings. See Recruiting Services Consensus Index
(RSCI) Rankings - 2015, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.basketball-reference.com/awards/recruit_rankings_2015.html (last visited June 9, 2016).
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2010

10

Terrence Jones

Drafted

2010

25

Doron Lamb

Drafted

2010

43

Stacey Poole

Transferred

2011

1

Anthony Davis

Drafted

2011

3

Michael Kidd-Gilchrist

Drafted

2011

7

Marquis Teague

Drafted

2011

18

Kyle Wiltjer

Transferred

2012

1

Nerlens Noel

Drafted

2012

8

Alex Poythress

Still at Kentucky

2012

12

Archie Goodwin

Drafted

2012

39

Willie Cauley-Stein

Drafted

2013

2

Julius Randle

Draft

2013

4

Andrew Harrison

Drafted

2013

6

Aaron Harrison

Undrafted, signed to NBA team

2013

9

Dakari Johnson

Drafted

2013

11

James Young

Drafted

2013

16

Marcus Lee

Still at Kentucky

2014

2

Karl-Anthony Towns

Drafted

2014

5

Devin Booker

Drafted

2014

9

Trey Lyles

Drafted

2014

18

Tyler Ulis

Still at Kentucky

Why do all these players attend Kentucky? Because schools cannot pay a
player more than the cost of attendance, players need another criterion to
select which school to attend. It appears this choice is often motivated by the
desire to win. And how do you know which schools are likely to win? It appears
players are looking at who won in the past.
And that means the very rule designed to promote competitive balance (i.e.,
restricting pay) is having the opposite effect. Restrictions on pay are actually
promoting competitive imbalance as the very best talents join each other on the
same small collection of teams.
IV. THE EXPLOITATION STORY
So if restricting pay does not promote competitive balance, what does this
rule accomplish? The answer is simple: exploitation.
Are college athletes exploited? Here is an answer the Author gave during
the NLRB hearing regarding the Northwestern football union case: “There is an
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economic definition of the word ‘exploitation[]’ . . . . A worker is
exploited . . . if their economic value is greater than their wages. . . . By that
definition, they are exploited.”29 The definition the Author quoted in the NLRB
hearing comes originally from the work of economist Joan Robinson. Looking
at the data, it is clear that many college athletes are generating more revenue
than they are being paid.
Consider the basketball players employed by Duke University. The men’s
basketball team of Duke University won the 2015 NCAA Men’s Basketball
Championship. According to data from the Department of Education—
submitted by Duke University—this team generated $33.7 million in revenue.30
Of this, $6.04 million went to Mike Krzyzewski (the team's head coach).31 In
other words, Duke paid 17.9% of team revenue to its coach.
To put that in perspective, Gregg Popovich led the San Antonio Spurs to the
NBA title in the 2013–2014 season. That year he was reportedly paid $8
million.32 Forbes, though, reported the Spurs had $170 million in revenue in the
2014–2015 season.33 So Popovich—who coached the Spurs to five NBA titles
in twenty years—is only paid 4.7% of team revenue. If Krzyzewski was paid
the same percentage of team revenue, his salary would only be $1,570.797.
What explains the difference? The NBA’s collective bargaining agreement
states the NBA players are to be paid approximately 50% of league revenue. In
contrast, Duke University cannot pay its basketball players more than the cost
of attendance. According to Duke University, this amount is $67,654.34 During
the 2014–2015 season, twelve different players received minutes for Duke
University. If each player was paid the cost of attendance, then Duke
University would have paid all of its players $811,848. In other words, Duke
would only have paid its players 2.4% of its revenue.
29. Economist: College Football Like NFL--But for No Pay, USA TODAY (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/02/19/college-football-nfl-player-pay-student-athletes-northwestern/5624651/.
30. Duke University: Revenues and Expenses, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/index.aspx (follow “Get data for one institution” hyperlink; then search “Duke University” in “Name of
Institution” field, then click the “Duke University” hyperlink, then follow the “Revenues and Expenses”
hyperlink) (last visited June 9, 2016).
31. Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Salaries: NCAAB Coaches, USA TODAY SPORTS,
http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/mens-basketball/coach/ (last visited June 9, 2016).
32. Dan Feldman, Phil Jackson and the Knicks Are Changing the Coaching-Salary Game, NBC
SPORTS (June 9, 2014), http://nba.nbcsports.com/2014/06/09/phil-jackson-and-the-knicks-are-changing-the-coaching-salary-game/.
33. The Business of Basketball: San Antonio Spurs, FORBES (Jan. 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/teams/san-antonio-spurs/.
34. Cost: 2015-2016 Estimated Cost of Attendance (Student Budget), DUKE FIN. AID, https://financialaid.duke.edu/undergraduate-applicants/cost (last visited June 9, 2016). These numbers are for the
2015–2016 academic year. The numbers from the 2014–2015 academic year are likely a bit less.
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If Duke was forced to pay its players 50% of its revenue—as required in the
NBA—then the average pay of each player would be $1.4 million. And if a
different allocation besides a perfectly equitable split was chosen, some players
would be worth substantially more.
For example, Duke could pay its players based on time spent on the court.
If Duke took this approach, a player like Quinn Cook would be worth nearly $3
million.35 In other words, Cook would be paid nearly forty-four times the
amount Duke is currently paying him.
Table Two: The Economic Value of the 2014–2015 Duke University Men’s
Basketball Players: Value According to Minutes Played
Player
Quinn Cook
Tyus Jones
Jahlil Okafor
Justise Winslow
Matt Jones
Amile Jefferson
Rasheed Sulaimon
Marshall Plumlee
Grayson Allen
Nick Pagliuca
Semi Ojeleye
Sean Kelly
TOTALS

Minutes Played
1395
1322
1143
1135
847
831
386
375
322
17
64
11
7,848

Estimated Economic Value of Player
$2,974,961
$2,817,891
$2,432,747
$2,415,534
$1,795,862
$1,761,435
$803,956
$780,288
$666,251
$145,716
$145,716
$145,716
$16,886,073

Of course, players are not generally just paid for their time. Players in sports
tend to be paid according to productivity. Following the methodology of the
Author,36 the number of wins each player produced on Duke’s 2014–2015 team
35. As noted, the NBA model results in 50% of revenue going to players. The NBA also imposes a
league minimum. The league minimum is about 10.4% of league average salary. Larry Coon, Table
of Contents: What Are the Players’ Salary Restrictions?, NBA SALARY CAP FAQ,
http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q16 (last updated July 8, 2015). Following this approach, Nick
Pagliuca, Semi Ojeleye, and Sean Kelly—whose minutes were quite limited—were given the estimated
minimum salary. To ensure player values do not exceed 50% of team revenue, the remaining players
saw their estimated value reduced by an amount that would keep the sum of all player values at 50% of
Duke revenue.
36. David J. Berri, A Simple Model of Worker Productivity in the National Basketball Association,
in 3 THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 18–22 (Brad R. Humphreys & Dennis R. Howard eds., 2008). This
methodology was later updated. See DAVID J. BERRI & MARTIN B. SCHMIDT, STUMBLING ON WINS:
TWO ECONOMISTS EXPOSE THE PITFALLS ON THE ROAD TO VICTORY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
148–54 (Kirk Jensen et al. eds., 2010); see also How to Calculate Wins Produced, WAGES WINS J.,
http://wagesofwins.com/how-to-calculate-wins-produced/ (last visited June 9, 2016).
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was estimated. The results indicate that Jahlil Okafor was worth nearly eight
wins to this team or 25.1% of the team’s total wins. If Okafor was paid 25.1%
of the revenue designated to the players (i.e., 50% of team revenue), then
Okafor’s value would be $4.13 million. And that means Okafor would be paid
approximately sixty-one times the cost of attendance.
Table Three: The Economic Value of the 2014–2015 Duke
University Men’s Basketball Players: Value According to Wins
Produced
Player
Jahlil Okafor
Justise Winslow
Tyus Jones
Amile Jefferson
Quinn Cook
Marshall Plumlee
Grayson Allen
Rasheed Sulaimon
Nick Pagliuca
Semi Ojeleye
Sean Kelly
Matt Jones
TOTALS

Wins Produced
7.97
6.64
5.83
5.12
3.34
1.91
0.87
0.58
0.06
0.01
-0.04
-0.51
31.78

Estimated Economic Value of Player
$4,130,034
$3,424,432
$2,992,423
$2,613,257
$1,668,938
$910,642
$357,736
$205,745
$145,716
$145,716
$145,716
$145,716
$16,886,071

Remember, if Coach Krzyzewski was paid according to the NBA model,
his pay would decline from over $6 million to about $1.57 million. If Okafor
was paid according to the NBA model for his production of wins, he would
make 2.6 times as much as his coach.
Such a result appears to be consistent with the NBA model. The San
Antonio Spurs paid Tony Parker, Tim Duncan, and Tiago Splitter more than
Gregg Popovich for the 2013–2014 season.37 That same season, the Miami Heat
reportedly paid Eric Spoelstra $3 million38 while paying both Chris Bosh and
LeBron James $19.1 million.39
Such a pattern actually makes sense.40 LeBron James reached the NBA
37. 2013-14 San Antonio Spurs Roster and Stats, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.basketball-reference.com/teams/SAS/2014.html (last visited June 9, 2016).
38. Berkowitz et al., supra note 31.
39. 2013-14 Miami Heat Roster and Stats, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.basketball-reference.com/teams/MIA/2014.html (last visited June 9, 2016).
40. Published research has shown that most NBA coaches do not alter player performance. See
generally David J. Berri et al., The Role of Managers in Team Performance, 4 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 75
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Finals six times with three different head coaches. One suspects a big reason
why these teams found success was the play of LeBron. In fact, LeBron made
this somewhat clear when he overruled his latest head coach David Blatt and
then proceeded to hit a game winning shot in the 2015 NBA playoffs.41
Given what viewers see in the NBA, it is not surprising to see evidence that
top players in college are so valuable. But it is important to emphasize that this
pattern does not just apply to the top players.
Consider the case of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. According
to the Department of Education, this program earned $2.1 million in revenue in
the 2014–2015 academic year. If 50% went to the players, then the thirteen
players who saw minutes would receive an average salary of $82,971.
Because the cost of attendance is $33,738,42 this means the average player on
this team is worth more than twice the money the school gives him.
Turning to the players’ production of wins, we also see evidence that one
player is worth more than the coach. Rob Jeter, the team’s head coach, was paid
about $450,000 in 2014, or more than 20% of the team’s revenue.43
Looking at the player’s productivity, though, Matt Tiby produced 6.5 wins on a
team that won fourteen games. That means Tiby is worth nearly $500,000.
As seen with Duke, the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee players are
also, on average, generating more revenue than they are being paid to attend the
school. In addition, the top player on this team is worth more than the coach.
In sum, whether looking at big or small schools, it is evident that players are
exploited by the current system in college sports.
What is to make of the athletes who are not generating substantial
revenue? Colleges have actually insisted for over a century that athletics are a
legitimate part of a student’s education. So just as society does not expect
students in other disciplines to generate revenue to justify their education, it also
does not make sense to expect athletes in non-revenue-generating sports to do
the same. To do so would suggest that colleges have not been entirely honest
about why athletics are part of college education in the first place.

(2009).
41. Dan Gartland, LeBron James Overruled David Blatt’s Play Call Before Hitting Buzzer Beater,
SI, http://www.si.com/nba/2015/05/10/lebron-james-david-blatt-play-call-final-shot (last updated May
11, 2015).
42. College Profile: University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, COLLEGEDATA, http://www.collegedata.com/cs/data/college/college_pg03_tmpl.jhtml?schoolId=1702 (last visited June 9, 2016).
43. Lori Nickel, ‘Stick to the Plan’: UWM Coach Rob Jeter Never Wavered, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 2014), http://www.jsonline.com/sports/panthers/stick-to-the-plan-uwm-coachrob-jeter-never-wavered-b99225500z1-250486541.html.
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A FREE MARKET FOR COLLEGE SPORTS LABOR

So it seems clear that college athletes are frequently exploited by the
NCAA. It also seems clear that the obvious solution is for the NCAA to abide
by the same rules we see in labor markets in non-sports industries.
Specifically, it is illegal—outside of sports—for firms to collude to limit the
compensation of employees.
A free market for labor in college sports would likely limit the ability of
teams like the University of Kentucky to dominate college basketball. As
noted, the 2014 edition of this team had six different players drafted by the
NBA. Four other players were ranked in the top twenty of their respective high
school recruiting class.
Kentucky’s roster during the 2014–2015 season had ten highly ranked
basketball prospects, which meant at any given time, five players sat on the
bench at Kentucky who would likely have started for most of the other 350
Division I-A teams.
Kentucky was able to stockpile this talent because the compensation of all
college athletes is capped. But what if that was not the case? If teams faced a
free market for labor, then the wages of these athletes would likely be increased
to a point where wages approximated economic value. And as we noted, that
economic value—if colleges followed the NBA model—often exceeds $1
million for the stars. It is unlikely Kentucky would give $1 million to an athlete
who does not play full-time. And that means some of these players who
attended Kentucky during the 2014–2015 season would have gone elsewhere in
a free market.
Those who remained, though, would be paid more. Where would this
money come from? One obvious source is the salaries paid to the head coach.
Again, John Calipari’s wage rivals what we see in the NBA. But revenues for
Calipari’s program do not justify such a wage. This wage is only possible
because players are not paid according to the free market.
The decrease in coaches’ salaries would not be the only impact of a free
market for college athletes. Essentially anyone currently benefitting from the
present labor market might see his or her benefits reduced. And if the courts
ever agreed that collusion in college sports is indeed illegal, that would likely
be the outcome.
There is, though, a legal way for colleges and universities to limit pay even
if the current arrangement was ruled illegal. Professional sports leagues have a
number of institutions that would clearly be illegal in non-sports
settings. These institutions include reverse-order drafts, restricted free agency,
and salary caps. Outside of sports, a firm could not collude to determine where
a worker works and how much he is allowed to be paid, but these institutions
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are legal in sports because the existence of these institutions results from
collective bargaining with unions.
The NCAA has resisted a players’ union because it believes its current
arrangement will not be changed. If that turns out not to be true, though, the
NCAA will definitely want players to unionize. That means the NCAA—
contrary to its position in the Northwestern football union case—should be in
favor of college athletes forming a union.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
College athletics have been commercial for over a century. And for over a
century, colleges and universities have refused to share the bulk of the revenue
sports generate with the athletes who make this possible.
The NCAA’s argument that this is necessary to promote competitive
balance is simply not consistent with the empirical evidence. What the evidence
indicates is that these rules have resulted in the economic exploitation of many
college athletes.
Thus far the NCAA has been able to successfully defend this system from
multiple legal challenges. If one of these challenges succeeds, though, the
NCAA will be faced with the same labor market seen outside the world of
sports. And just as firms thrive in this labor market in the rest of the economy,
we can expect the NCAA to continue to thrive as well. The only difference will
be that the players will get more, while those who benefit and promote the
current system will get less.

